MIL-STD-1798C
that may have an impact on the system itself, or which have been identified in previous reports as possible contenders.
b. Develop inspection criteria. If no written criteria exist, develop the inspection criteria for each item identified as requiring inspection. Every item must be addressed, and the criteria assigned must involve a pass or fail-type inspection.
c. Perform the inspection. The inspection will be performed, using the criteria outlined in the inspection phase.
d. Analyze the collected data. The inspection results will be analyzed, and, if required, a program will be developed to refurbish that subsystem.
5.5.3.6.4 Equipment usage and environments.
The usage and environments of safety- and mission-critical components shall be monitored and tracked to determine if usage and environments are in accordance with definitions used in equipment design. If it is determined that usage or environments are different than expected, then maintenance, inspection, and replacement intervals shall be re-evaluated to determine when the equipment should be serviced, inspected, or replaced to maintain integrity and safety. Operational usage data should also be gathered and systems engineering analysis conducted on that data to look for changes in planned usage of the system with potential unintended consequences. Two examples of this type of analysis are:
a. The T-38 Flight Load Data Recorder Program: the objective of the program is to develop maneuver spectra, stress spectra, and operational usage profiles for the T-38. Strain gages are installed at critical locations on the test aircraft to verify localized stress/strain conditions. This data will provide the baseline inputs for an update to the
T-38 Component Tracking/Monitoring Program (CTMP). The T-38 CTMP is used to set inspection intervals for the fleet, providing an essential element for the safety of flight for
each aircraft. At least 1000 hours of valid flight loads data will be collected, processed and analyzed. This program will create a usage assessment and a validation of
localized stress/strains for critical components.
b. The KC-135 operators started using the hydraulically driven aerial refueling pumps to feed engines. These pumps did not have the same capability to safely run dry that the electrically powered boost pumps possess, therefore they created a potential for a catastrophic mishap. It is critical that the program maintain constant vigilance of new usage of the weapon system and update the FMECA as appropriate as existing equipment is used in new or different applications or environments.
5.5.3.7 Manage Safety- and Mission-critical components.
Safety-critical components shall be maintained such that failure is not expected to occur throughout the operational life. The components shall be inspected and/or replaced at some portion of their demonstrated service life to ensure failure-free operation. This is to account for variability that exists in service life due to scatter in material properties and damage that occurs during manufacturing and maintenance. The initial and recurring inspections shall be established based on one half the time required for a detectable flaw to grow to critical size.
The MECSIP Manager shall determine the demonstrated life for each safety-critical component and establish the maintenance (inspection or replacement) intervals that result in the failure
frequency falling within the improbable range per AWB-013 and NAVAIRINST 5000.21B.
Where economically justified, mission-critical parts shall not be allowed to fail in service. Those safety- and mission-critical components with life limits shall be serialized and have their usage tracked.
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