MIL-STD-1798 Mechanical Equipment And Subsystems Integrity ProgramThe purpose of this standard is to describe the general process to achieve and maintain the physical and functional integrity of the mechanical elements of aircraft systems. The goal of this integrity program is to achieve the desired level of safety and aircraft availability at the most economic cost across the life cycle of the weapon system. This standard allows the process to be tailored in a competitive environment to meet specific equipment, subsystem, and/or system requirements. The Mechanical Equipment and Subsystems Integrity Program MECSIP is implemented in the planning process and continued until retirement of the system.

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MIL-STD-1798C

5.3.5 Electromagnetic effects and lightning.

Analyses of controls and subsystems with electrical/electronic components shall be performed to determine their electromagnetic susceptibility and emissions characteristics. Analyses of controls and subsystems shall be performed to determine their susceptibility to damage resulting from a lightning strike (both direct and indirect damage).

5.3.6 Software performance and testing requirements.

All controls and subsystems performance requirements shall be analyzed to ensure adequate design, performance, and testing of all initial and subsequent flight release versions of safety- critical software. Examples of these analyses include: confirmation of component and system performance versus requirements, memory usage, worst-case timing analysis, and validity of special test equipment (electronic verification benches).

5.3.7 Abnormal operation design margin.

Analyses of all safety- critical controls and components shall be performed to meet program requirements in the presence of abnormal operating conditions and/or failure scenarios. Examples of these analyses include: design margin for over speeds, over temperatures, overpressures, explosive atmosphere, exposure to fire and blade-out.

5.3.8 Reliability and maintainability.

Analyses of controls and subsystem components' reliability and maintainability shall be performed. Maintainability analyses shall be performed for both installed and uninstalled conditions. Examples of these analyses include: component Mean Flight Hours Between Failure (MFHBF) and Mean Time to Replace (MTTR).

A database that can grow with the program to form the basis of the component/subsystem reliability tracking system shall be used. This database will grow into the "Functional Systems Integrated Database (FSID)" in Task V of MECSIP (see 5.5.2).

5.3.8.1 Electrical/optical cable maintainability.

Analyses of controls and subsystem electrical/optical cabling shall be performed to ensure they can be properly maintained when exposed to sea level cold day conditions and the expected maintenance environments, including chemical/biological attacks. Examples of these analyses include: connector removal and replacement, and cable routing and placement.

5.3.8.2 Ground handling.

Analyses of controls and subsystems components shall be performed to ensure they will not sustain damage when exposed to normal ground handling. Examples of these analyses include: component removal and replacement, transport loads, component mount loads, and plumbing loads.

5.3.8.3 De-rating/up-rating.

Analyses of electronic controls and subsystem components shall be performed to identify and manage de-rating or up-rating their environmental and functional performance requirements. A de-rating/up-rating methodology shall be established and documented in the MECSIP Master Plan.