MIL-STD-1798C
components and/or process to fabricate safety-critical components shall also be reviewed to verify integrity is maintained. Such changes shall only be implemented upon approval from the Cognizant Engineering Authority.
5.5.1.12 Cost of unreliability model.
The Program Office should consider developing a model to quantify the cost of unreliability for the weapon system. Reliability and Maintainability improvements must be justified from a financial perspective for those improvements to "buy" their way onto the aircraft. The Cost of Unreliability Model will allow the Program Office to estimate the current cost of unreliability and compare it to the expected future cost of unreliability if an R&M improvement change is made. A simple "payback period" is identified by dividing the yearly savings due to improved reliability by the cost to implement the change. This is a powerful tool to evaluate R&M-type improvements in competition for limited funds to obtain the most cost-effective solutions. The MECSIP Technical Advisor in AFLCMC/EN - EZ at AFLCMC.EZF.Mailbox@wpafb.af.mil will provide a generic model, upon request.
5.5.1.13 Include MECSIP in the overall aircraft maintenance program.
It is recommended that Program Offices develop an overarching maintenance plan of which the MECSIP tasks are one element. The goal of this overarching maintenance plan is to achieve and continually improve aviation material readiness and safety standards, with optimum use of manpower, material, facilities, and funds. The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (reference COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2B) provides specific guidance for structuring an overall aircraft maintenance program.
5.5.2 Subtask 2: Develop and utilize a Functional Systems Integrated Database (FSID).
This task is intended to build on the FSID is already in existence per 5.3.8. If a FSID does not already exist, the Program Office shall develop the FSID. If it is necessary to develop a new FSID, consideration should be given to utilization of the C-5 Program FSID database shell as a model (USAF owns the rights to this database). NOTE: Unique information system solutions should not be constructed for Program requirements without first ensuring a Department of Defense or Service-level (i.e., USAF, USN) enterprise information system solution does not already exist, is ready to deploy, or could easily be modified to accommodate the weapon system's MECSIP requirements. Configuration management is a major constituent of life management and OSS&E. The ability to track individual items during use plays a direct role in the fidelity of life management. New ways of collecting data to populate the FSID are often not required. The FSID typically needs only incorporate data from existing data collection systems.
5.5.2.1 Component inspection and/or replacement interval.
All safety-critical components shall be managed to preclude safety-critical in-flight failures, using either a damage tolerance or a risk-based approach. MECSIP encourages use of this same approach for mission-critical components; however, if an economic analysis does not justify the cost of implementing life limits and tracking mission-critical components, it is permissible to "fly
to failure".
5.5.2.2 Component Minimum Acceptable Performance (MAP) levels.
The Program Office shall define component MAP levels for all safety-, mission- critical components. The program may want to also include MAPs for durability-critical parts. The MAP is derived by using MTBF data collected over many years (typically a minimum of three years of MTBF data is needed for the determination of MAP to be effective) . The MECSIP
Manager determines the minimum MTBF each component is expected to achieve. This number
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