MIL-STD-1798C
5.5.1.2 Establish the sustainment philosophy (e.g., preventative maintenance).
The MECSIP Team shall establish the sustainment philosophy for every MECSIP system component. Some weapon platforms are utilized much longer than originally programmed and the reliability or downtime is below the acceptable standards. Additionally, the cost of sending Maintenance Recovery Teams (MRTs) to repair the aircraft off station may be greater than the cost to apply preventive maintenance. Preventive maintenance is any action performed periodically to maximize the probability that a component or system will achieve the desired level of safety and reliability. When safety or mission reliability is affected by a component or system, a Preview Analysis (reference 5.5.3.6.1) shall be performed to determine the functions of the components or systems and identify trends. In-depth analysis (reference 5.5.3.6.2) may be performed on key failure modes within selected components and systems. The in-depth analysis will include FMECA and risk assessments to ascertain the severity and rate of each occurrence. The risk assessment metrics will be used to begin the priority process for
implementation. The use of logic trees on failure modes will assist in determining the preventive maintenance task to be performed. The best solution for dealing with a failure mode is
determined by comparison of the available options. If an option is not immediately available
(e.g., redesign, new technology), a cost-benefit analysis should be performed to compare the current available options potential future options to determine the optimum solution. At times, the least expensive option will not be the best solution when the operational consequences are considered. Aircraft downtime and reliability must be part of the decision logic. Document all new preventive maintenance actions in the appropriate maintenance publications. The Cost of Unreliability Model (reference 5.5.1.12) will be useful in evaluating the impact of aircraft downtime and reliability.
5.5.1.3 Gather available maintenance data and design information.
All OEM required maintenance actions shall be incorporated into the appropriate maintenance publications, except in cases where analysis/experience demonstrates a better approach. The OEM typically provides the initial design and testing information for weapon systems. Most drawings and manufacturing specifications can be accessed by qualified users through the Joint Engineering Data Management Information and Control System (JEDMICS) at
5.5.1.3.1 Update or Generate Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).
If FMECA reports are missing or out of date, those reports shall be updated or generated. The existence of FMECAs for all MECSIP Equipment is the essential first element in both component classification and application of Reliability-Centered Maintenance. It is acceptable to perform a top down System Level FMECA when generating FMECAs during the sustainment phase of a program. The system-level FMECA is initiated by identifying the functional blocks containing high risk components. These blocks are then analyzed in more detail. The FMECA results will allow the MECSIP team to classify components for criticality per 5.2.10, Component classification). During the sustainment phase, the MECSIP manager shall insure safety- and mission-critical components are identified.
5.5.1.3.2 Generate Hazard Analysis (HA).
If HA reports are missing or outdated, those reports shall be regenerated. The existence of a HA for each MECSIP system is necessary for part classification (per 5.2.10, Component classification) .
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