MIL-STD-1798C
5.2.10 Aviation-Critical Safety Items.
Per the Joint Instruction SECNAVINST 4140.2, AFI 20-106, DA Pam 95-9, DLAI 3200.4, DCMA INST CSI (AV); Management of Aviation Critical Safety Items, all Critical Safety Items (CSI) (AV) shall be subject to sustainment requirements governing:
a. the initial determination of item criticality and subsequent changes to this determination;
b. coding and tracking of aviation CSI;
c. the process for ensuring the adequacy of technical data and proposed changes;
d. the process for approving sources of supply and repair/overhaul;
e. the surveillance process assuring that approved sources retain required capabilities;
f. authorities for one-time organic manufacture of CSIs under exigent circumstances; and g. requirements for disposing of CSIs when no longer needed by military aviation.
A part is automatically considered a "Safety-Critical Item" in MECSIP if defined as a "CSI".
5.2.11 Prevention of failure for Safety-Critical Parts.
Safety-critical parts shall not be allowed to fail in service; therefore for safety-critical components, it shall be necessary to:
a. Design to last the life of the aircraft (with appropriate condition feedback assessments to ensure design assumptions were correct); or
b. Define a replacement interval; or
c. Utilize a damage tolerance approach (with associated inspection interval); or
d. Show risk of failure is acceptably low with acceptance of risk at the appropriate level per
MIL-STD-882.
A Business Case Analysis shall be conducted for each mission-critical and durability-critical part to determine if designing/testing of the part to operate without failure over the design life of the system is justified.
The aircraft subsystems and associated parts, considered separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so that:
a. The occurrence of any failure condition resulting in loss of a safety-critical function is improbable per AWB-013 and NAVAIRINST 5000.21B, and
b. The combined rate of any combination of failures that lead to loss of a safety-critical function shall be improbable per AWB-013 and NAVAIRINST 5000.21B.
c. Warning information must be provided to alert the crew to unsafe system operating conditions, and to enable them to take appropriate corrective action. Systems, controls, and associated monitoring and warning means must be designed to minimize crew errors which could create additional hazards.
d. Compliance with this prevention of failure for safety-critical parts requirement must be shown by analysis and, where necessary, by appropriate ground, flight, or simulator tests. The analysis must consider:
1. Possible modes of failure, including malfunctions and damage from external sources.
2. The rate of multiple failure. For each safety-critical function where redundancy is the control utilized, the MECSIP Manager shall identify the level of reliability required by
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